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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
Symposium on
World Trade and the Environment
SYDNEY M. CONE, III*: From your left to your right are the following
panelists who will speak in this order for fifteen to twenty minutes each.
After the four panelists have completed their talks, we will have a general
discussion in which I hope all of you will feel free to participate. Because we
have C-SPAN with us tonight, we do request that when you participate, you
come forward and use the microphones. Starting from the left, the first
panelist is David Balton who has come to us from Washington today. He is
the Director of the Office of Marine Conservation of the U.S. Department of
State. Prior to being Director of the Office of Marine Conservation, David
was at the State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor where he
functioned as a lawyer. David's status was promoted from that of lawyer to
client, and many of us in this room know the significance of that. The next
panelist is Steve Charnovitz, Director of Global Environment & Trade Study
at Yale University. I am particularly happy that Steve is here because I will
not be the only person speaking with something of a southern accent, and
Steve is a lawyer as well as Director of Global and Environment and Trade
Study at Yale. The next panelist is Philippe Sands, and I am personally
delighted to finally meet Philippe face-to-face. He and I have talked over the
phone over a long period of time about having an event such as this. The
origins of this event really go back to Philippe calling me up one day and in
effect suggesting this event.
That day was some time in the past and we are finally here. Philippe is
a Reader in International Law at London University and he also participates
in NYU's Global Law School. Our final panelist is T.N. Srinivasan, the
Chairman of the Department of Economics at Yale University, and we are
very privileged to have him with us. T.N. Srinivasan is well known in the
area of trade and we do not often have the privilege of having him join us
from New Haven. He is also a chaired Professor of Economics at Yale. I
hope that this is an adequate introduction of such a distinguished panel and
I will now ask David Balton to start. He will attempt to give us the
*. Sydney M. Cone, III is the C.V. Starr Professor of Law and Director of New York
Law School's Center for International Law.
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background and the foreground of the substance of the current debate over
world trade and the environment. Mr. Balton.
DAVID BALTON*: Thank you very much, Professor. Let me say at the
outset that I am not an expert on trade and the environment as a subject. My
job at the State Department is to care about critters that swim in the ocean.
Yet in recent times I find myself called before the United States Court of
International Trade and the World Trade Organization. These pesky trade
issues will not let me go. I have concluded that I must have done something
truly terrible in a previous life that this would be my punishment. For
tonight, I am going to leave the large conceptualization of these issues to the
other panelists, who, I assure you, have spent much more time thinking about
the big picture than I have. I will instead attempt to present a ground level
view, a view from the trenches, of two of the trade and environment cases
that have become cause celebre in recent years - tunas and dolphins, and
more recently, shrimp and sea turtles.
Starting with tunas and dolphins: for reasons nobody completely
understands, yellow-fin tuna and dolphins swim together in one part of the
world, the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. Although people do not know why
that happens, fishermen long ago realized that it is possible to round-up
dolphins, put a net around them, and catch the tuna that are swimming
underneath them very efficiently. There is only one problem with this
approach. It led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of dolphins a year
dating back to the 1960s. When this came to light, it provoked quite a
reaction, particularly in the United States. Congress first responded by
imposing restrictions on the way United States fishermen could fish, in order
to protect the dolphins. Actually the U.S. vessels found themselves leaving
the fishery as a result of these restrictions. Then Congress decided that, for
other countries that wanted to sell their yellow-fin tuna in the United States,
they would have to abide by comparable protections for the dolphins. This
lead to trade embargoes upon a number of countries, particularly from Latin
America.
As many of you may know, this in turn led to not one but two different
GATT cases, the first bought principally by Mexico in 1991, and a second
brought principally by the European Union in 1993. In both cases, GATT
panels determined that these embargoes under the Marine Mammel
Protection Act were a violation of our international obligations under the
GATT. But neither of those decisions was ever brought to fruition for a
* David Balton is Director of the U.S. Department of State's Office of Marine
Conservation.
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variety of reasons. Instead, the tuna and dolphin situation has proceeded
down a different path, not currently before the WTO. Instead, there has been
a cooperative multilateral effort to solve this problem. The multilateral effort
began in 1992. There was an original agreement, affectionately called the La
Jolla Agreement, in which the countries whose vessels fish for tuna in the
Pacific agreed to take a number of measures to reduce dolphin deaths there.
And, in fact, they succeeded in dramatically reducing dolphin deaths,
probably in hopes that the U.S. embargoes on the tuna would be lifted. But
those embargoes were not lifted.
The situation appeared to be headed for a long term stalemate until
1995, when the countries in question, including the United States and several
U.S. environmental groups came together in Panama City and adopted what
we now call the Declaration of Panama. This was a deal which said: if the
U.S. lifts the embargoes and does a number of other things, the countries
whose vessels fish in the eastern Pacific Ocean for tuna will take additional
measures to protect dolphins. These countries will turn the 1992 agreement,
which had been a voluntary agreement, into one that was legally binding.
With the adoption of the Declaration of Panama, the scene shifted to
Congress. After a couple of difficult years and long debate, about a year ago
in the summer of 1997, legislation was in fact passed to give effect to that
deal, the Panama Declaration. Negotiations then began on the international
plane to finalize and bring to fruition the international agreement to protect
dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. That agreement is not yet in force, but
it will provide for very stringent requirements to protect dolphins in the
course of the tuna fishery. I will add that today about three thousand
dolphins are killed in this fishery, which may still seem like a lot to you. But
it represents only one percent of former dolphin mortality and represents a
fraction of one percent of all the dolphins in that region which is in fact the
stricter standard than in most fisheries that occur inside U.S. waters.
Let's take a look at shrimp and sea turtles. Sea turtle species are
endangered. They've been on the U.S. endangered species list for a long
time and a number of international endangered species lists, including
Appendix I to the Convention on International Trade and Endangered
Species Annex for some time. One of the principal causes of sea turtle
mortality, at least in U.S. waters, is that they get caught in trawl nets that
shrimpers use. Shrimp are caught by dragging a net along the bottom of the
sea floor. Only about ten percent of what is caught in the net is actually
shrimp. All sorts of other things get caught as well, including sea turtles.
Sea turtles need to breathe air and, when they get caught in the nets, they
drown. Fortunately for the turtles, a piece of technology was developed in
the 1980s called turtle excluder devices or TEDs. If any of you had an old
style barbecue grill dating back to the 1950s, you will know more or less
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what a TED looks like. It is a round piece of metal with slats in it. If it were
put on top your charcoal grill, you could grill your steaks on it. But if it's put
in the back-end of a shrimp trawl net, it will allow the shrimp to pass through
as the net is moved forward in the water. But large objects like sea turtles hit
the grid and then are directed out a trap door in the net. A TED costs a few
hundred dollars. It is a remarkably effective piece of technology and quite
cheap - I think you'd agree. Starting in the 1980s, the U.S. began to
institute requirements for U.S. vessels that fish for shrimp in areas where sea
turtles occur to use TEDs. By 1990, it was a requirement on all of them.
In 1989, Congress also passed a law as a rider to an appropriations act
that prohibits importation of shrimp that is harvested in ways harmful to sea
turtles. The Department of State was given responsibility to implement this
law and, in the first few years of implementation, we decided that Congress
had really intended its application to be limited to an area of the Caribbean
region all the way down to Brazil. I won't go into the long rationale we had
for that, but I will say that the rationale was challenged in court. At the very
end of 1995, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) decided that we
were wrong and that Congress had from the start intended the law to apply
on a worldwide basis. At the time that the first CIT case was handed down,
we were wrapping up negotiations with our Latin American friends to try to
"multilateralize" this issue, much as the tuna-dolphin issue was becoming
multilateral. We were negotiating what has become, and is currently before
the Senate for advice and consent, the Inter-American Convention for the
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. One of the things this treaty
requires is that shrimp trawl vessels use TEDs. It requires a lot of other
things as well.
We then were confronted with the situation that we were not only
dealing with countries in Latin America but, because of the CIT decision, all
countries that wanted to sell their shrimp to the United States. Some of the
largest exporters of shrimp to the United States are in the Indian Ocean
region - Thailand, in particular. Thailand was not amused when it found
itself subject to this law and, with three other countries, filed a case at the
World Trade Organization about which we will hear more later. There is, as
well, ongoing litigation in the U.S. Court of International Trade about the
Department of State's implementation of this law restricting shrimp imports.
For all the controversy that these two laws have given rise to, I think
most who look at the situation soberly would say that the trade restrictions
seem to have brought about progress on the environmental front. In fact,
dolphin moralities in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean tuna fishery are much
lower than they were before. One could quibble about the cause and effect,
but my sense, as someone who works on the issue day to day, is that it really
did matter that these countries were prohibited from selling their tuna in the
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U.S. unless they started to protect dolphins better. And, similarly, today 18
countries in addition to the U.S. require the use of TEDs on all their shrimp
trawl vessels operating in areas where sea turtles occur. Those 18 countries
are developing countries. I am quite sure that many of them would not have
those TEDs requirements in place but for the U.S. restrictions on imports.
That said, these laws have entailed certain costs as well. They have
engendered some political resentment from the countries that feel that we are
imposing our environmental standards on them. I would say, as a personal
matter, that I have noted a palpable lack of cooperation from the affected
countries on related issues due to this resentment. It is also my sense that the
trade embargoes have had diminishing effectiveness over time, as countries
figure out ways to find other markets for their products. And, of course,
there is the matter of potential conflict with international trading rules. From
the point of view of the Department of State, the obvious solution would be
to have multilateral standards for environmental protection and multilateral
agreements to promote adherence to those standards, including through the
use of trade measures. We have had success in the tuna-dolphin situation,
although that success has not nailed down yet. The tuna-dolphin agreement
that we negotiated has not yet entered into force. Similarly, the Inter-
American Sea Turtle Convention that I mentioned earlier is not yet in force
either. We would like to negotiate something a comparable for the Indian
Ocean region but it takes two or, in this case, more like 30, to tango. Those
countries need to demonstrate a willingness to do so as well. In short,
multilateral solutions are easy to call for - hard to achieve. I'll end my
comments here and pass the microphone on to the next speaker. Thank you.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: The next speaker is Steve Charnovitz from the
Global Environment and Trade Study at Yale. I'm intervening just to say
that I want to throw out a term that has been used by some commentators on
the United States' approach in these two cases David just told us about, and
the term has been called creative unilateralism. There are those on the panel
who will, I think, dispute that term and say that unilateralism by the United
States is to be condemned, but there are commentators - and it's possible
that Mr. Balton would agree - that think that the United States'
unilateralism has been creative.
STEVE CHARNOVITZ': Thank you. Trade in the environment is a vast
and expanding set of issues, far more than anyone could cover in one talk.
* Steve Charnovitz is the Director of the Global Environment & Trade Study at Yale
University.
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So I thought tonight I would try to focus on what's most important for
lawyers which is: "What does emerging international trade law dictate
regarding the environment and health?" I'll start with domestic environment
and health and then discuss some global issues. Now, the official line from
the World Trade Organization was presented in a speech by Mr. Ruggiero,
the Director General of the WTO several months ago when he said the
following: "Subject to the basic requirement of non-discrimination, WTO
rules place no constraint on the policy choices available to a country to
protect its own environment or health standards."' That's the official line
coming from the WTO. The question I want to pose to you is whether we
can reconcile that official line with the actual decisions that have been
coming out of WTO adjudication. I think the answer is no, we can't.
I want to discuss briefly a few cases. The gasoline case, which was a
complaint against the United States Environmental Protection Agency
standard on gasoline, the hormone case against the European Commission
(regarding their ban on meat produced with growth hormones), and a more
recent Australian Salmon case that there is a little op-ed that I wrote about
that was handed out in front this evening? Those are the three cases on
domestic environment and health. In all three of those cases the defendant
government lost. I think that's significant. There's another decision that I'll
mention briefly - the Japan Alcohol case. It's not an environmental case,
but the way in which the panel interpreted GATT law has significance for
environmental regulation.
Let me start with the interpretations of the GATT Article XX headstone.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) is a set of rules
about when and how governments can use trade restrictions. Article XX in
the GATT sets out General Exceptions to the rest of the GATT for public
nnli.v 3 Arti.lp YY h..ine %,;th a haActnn th * 1 Io o t sftn.... RI;-
conditions for using the exceptions. The interpretations of this headstone
first arose in this gasoline case. If you're not familiar with them, let me just
briefly say there was a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulation that
applied a different standard to foreign origin gasoline then to domestic
gasoline. Now, I'm not at all defending the U.S. regulation. I wrote at the
time that I thought it was GATT-illegal. But in holding it to be GATT
1. "A Shared Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence For Our Global Age," Address
to the Conference on "Globalization as a Challenge for German Business," Organized by
the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Association of German Chambers
of Industry and Commerce, December 9, 1997, WTO Press Release at 3.
2. Steve Charnovitz, Slipping on Salmon Trade, J. COMM., Sept. 10, 1998, at 6A.
3. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATTArticle XX, 25 J.
OF WORLD TRADE 37 (1991).
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illegal, the WTO appellate authority went way too far and sharply constricted
the already narrow window available for the environment in GATT Article
xx.
Unfortunately, I don't have time to go over all the new ground broken
in that gasoline case but let me mention three points which I think are most
significant.4 First, the GATT Appellate Body assigned the burden of
persuasion onto the defendant government. Second, it held that EPA failed
to meet this burden because it did not show how it had factored into its
decision making the higher cost being imposed on foreign gasoline
producers. And, third, EPA did not show that it had sought a joint
administrative solution with regulatory agencies in Venezuela and or
Columbia which were the two complaining countries. What I want to say
here is that there is some dissonance between what the Director General says
about there being no constraint and the fact that recent WTO caseload
deepens the constraints. All three of those interpretations I just outlined are
brand new interpretations in the WTO and all are new constraints on what
national decisionmaking can do.
Looking at the WTO Appellate Body's criticism from a public policy
perspective, one could easily agree with it. EPA should get better at
weighing the cost of its regulations on foreigners. For that matter, EPA
should get better at weighing the cost of its regulations on domestic
companies. But in imposing these requirements, the WTO is imposing new
constraints and it seems clear that the Director General's speech quoted
really was whitewashing that fact.
Let me now move to another trade rule. This involves the hormone and
salmon cases. These are cases under the new WTO agreement on sanitary
and phytosanitary measures and this is an agreement that supervises national
regulations on products for reasons of public health for food safety. The
hormone case is probably familiar to you; it's gotten a lot of publicity.
Basically, the European Commission was banning, and is still banning, meat
produced with hormones. The Appellate Body found that there was no
evidence that that meat was less safe than other meat would be for people to
eat and so the E.U. lost that case.5
4. See Steve Charnovitz, New WTO Adjudication and its Implications for the
Environment, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. 851 (1996)(discussing the Gasoline decision). United
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
5. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, Jan. 16, 1998. See also Steve
Charnovitz, Environment and Health under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'L LAW. 901,
914-16 (1998).
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The salmon case, a fairly recent one, is, I think, a different situation and
an interesting one. Australia was banning the importation of untreated
salmon - salmon that had not been heat treated - on the grounds that this
salmon could contain pathogens that would be very harmful to Australia.
Australia being an island nation, is vulnerable to these exotic pathogens.
Nevertheless, the panel ruled against Australia. They said, yes, there was
evidence that these pathogens could be harmful, but the panel felt that
Australia's regulation was not adequately based on a risk assessment. I
think, in that regard, the panel was probably right.6 Australia hadn't
procedurally done as much as it should have. But the panel went farther than
that. They said that Australia also violated the WTO because it was being
inconsistent in its regulations. The panel compared the way Australia
regulated salmon to the way it regulated other fish such as eel. The panel
then concluded that Australia was being tougher on salmon than on eel and,
therefore, Australia was violating the WTO because they were inconsistent.
The panel also held that Australia was violating the WTO because it hadn't
used the most least-trade restrictive regulation. The panel said that there are
other methods that could have been used instead of heat treatment. Australia
hadn't done so and therefore that was a violation.
Again, let me state my overall point. These decisions demonstrate that
the WTO is placing entirely new constraints on national decision-making.
Some of these new disciplines were written during the Uruguay round. In
this caselaw on sanitary standards, we are seeing tentative steps toward the
development of international administrative law. Perhaps that's a good
development. Nevertheless I think we need to be honest with ourselves and
admit that yes, the WTO does impose constraints on national decision-
making.
Annther issue T'lI jiut toluh on briefly is the Soca ... the "aim a.n
effect" test in GATT Article 111. That is GATT's national treatment
provision. The aim and effect test was designed in the early 1990s to enable
panels to distinguish between two products as to whether or not they were
"like" products. The GATT National Treatment Rule applies only to "like"
products and so you have to determine whether two products being
complained about are like or unlike. This came up in the Japan Alcohol case
where Japan was being challenged on the grounds that it was taxing foreign-
produced alcohol higher than domestic produced alcohol.7 Japan said that
6. See Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS18/R, June 12, 1998.
7. See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, WT/DS8/R, July 11,
1996.
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they were different products because they were chemically different. The
panel disagreed and did so by tossing out the aim and effect test.8
Without an aim and effect test, the national treatment requirement takes
on very sharp edges. Losing that safe harbor makes it very difficult for
governments to use tax or regulatory policy to distinguish products based on
policy distinctions. Let me give you a couple of examples. Suppose a
government wanted to impose a motor vehicle tax based on fuel economy.
With an aim and effect test, the panel could say that high and low fuel
economy vehicles are not like products. In 1994, a GATT panel did just that
and allowed a United States law that distinguished between high and low fuel
economy vehicles.9 But without this aim and effect test, a panel could say
that all automobiles are like all other automobiles and therefore a tax based
on fuel economy could be viewed as a GATT violation. The WTO has laid
a serious political trap for itself here. I should note that so far this Alcohol
decision has not had any ramifications for the environment. But it is only a
matter of time before regulations or taxes with environmental distinctions
will be hit under this new rule.
Let me now move from the domestic environment and health to global
issues. Dave Balton has talked about the shrimp-turtle case and I think that's
an example of where a very difficult dispute is now before the Appellate
Body and we'll have to see what they do with it. For global issues the
Director General in his speech does not claim that GATT rules are
innocuous. Mr. Ruggiero declares that a government cannot under WTO
rules "apply trade restrictions to attempt to change the process and
production methods or other policies of its trading partners."' So here the
WTO Director General, I think, is being honest in what the WTO constrains.
This leads to an important question: "should the WTO be constraining that?"
As was indicated by Mr. Balton, the panel said that the United States
should have tried to negotiate a multilateral agreement. Yet I think that's a
one-sided inquiry just to ask the United States why it didn't negotiate. It
takes two to negotiate. I think it's just as relevant to ask say Malaysia or
Thailand why it doesn't protect sea turtles.
8. See Steve Charnovitz, Environment and Health under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32
INT'L LAW. 901, 902-05 (1998); Robert E. Hudec, GATF/WTO Constraints on National
Regulation: Requiem for and "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 626-33 (1998).
9. United States - Taxes on Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994).
10. "A Shared Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence For Our Global Age," Address
to the Conference on "Globalization as a Challenge for German Business," Organized by
the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Association of German Chambers
of Industry and Commerce, December 9, 1997, WTO Press Release at 3.
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The recognition that sea turtles are endangered goes back at least as
early as 1924 when international action was first sought. If the WTO
mechanism merely asks the question of why the United States uses a trade
measure, but doesn't ask the question of why certain Asian countries are not
safeguarding sea turtles, then it's a rather unbalanced mechanism. That
Appellate Body decision is due out in about a month and I can assure you if
it upholds the broad panel decision, there are going to be a lot of
environmental groups that are going to be very unhappy with the WTO. Just
last week, I got this new booklet "Slain by Trade" put out by the Sea Turtle
Restoration Project attacking the WTO, and that's even before the decision
comes out.
Finally, let me just offer a few observations. I think the WTO is clearly
having an impact on environment and health law, but it's not happening the
other way around. International environmental institutions are not yet having
much effect on trade law. We are not inculcating environmental principles
into trade policymaking. Indeed, the WTO has been resisting closer ties to
environmental institutions. I think there is a real agenda here for using
environmental principles to strengthen the trade regime. Environmentalists
know that subsidies are bad - fishery subsidies or agriculture subsidies, or
energy subsidies - and yet the WTO has not moved to stop those subsidies.
Environmentalists know that protectionism in agriculture or textiles is bad
for developing countries - it keeps them poor - and yet the WTO is
moving very slowly to deal with that kind of protectionism.
Environmentalists favor market mechanisms like labels to inform consumers
and the public about how products are produced. Yet environmentalists fear
that the WTO will try to outlaw labels about products in the name of freer
trade. For instance, labels that say whether or not timber has been
sustainably produced.
So this points to a deeper agenda. We have to do more than just defend
environmental laws against trade rules. We need to infuse the best of
environmental policy into trade policy. Typically trade and environmental
policy diverge. Environmental policy aspires to transcend nationalism and
it utilizes a holistic approach whereas trade policy often reflects autarchy and
nationalism and doesn't recognize the cybernetic connections in our world
economy. The challenge in the years ahead will be to improve both the trade
and environmental regime by encouraging cooperation between those
regimes and by encouraging each of those regimes to learn the best practices
from each other. Thank you.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Thank you very much. Well, you certainly put a
challenge before the next two speakers as well as before the whole world and
so let's move to the next two speakers right away. Philippe Sands.
[Vol. 19
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PHILIPPE SANDS': Thank you very much, Sydney. I greatly enjoyed
listening to the first two contributions. I think it's worth stepping even one
notch further into the genesis of this event. It actually got triggered, going
back even a month before our conversation, by a letter written by Professor
Jagdish Bhagwati in the Financial Times in the summer of 1997. Various
other people read that letter. Professor Bhagwati, who is a very distinguished
economist at Columbia, was running a thesis that it would be very dangerous
to integrate into the WTO system, objectives which were not directly related
to the promotion of trade namely environmental protection and labor
standards by which, he also indicated human rights standards. I wrote a
response to that letter which indicated that there was another way of looking
at this and that it was time to look at the international legal order in a more
holistic manner. We have got to the point where today we deal with issues
in a very fragmentary way in the international legal order. We have a law of
trade, a law of human rights, a law relating to the activities of multilateral
development banks, a law of the sea, a law of the environment, and
numerous laws too expansive to mention. Somehow, the textbooks treat this
order as though they are disconnected, as though the international legal order
somehow is this fragmentary structure in which there is no contact or
communication and that each of these systems lives in a state of hermetic
encapsulation where it doesn't reach out.
Professor Bhagwati's basic thesis was that if we talk about environment,
labor, and human rights standards in the trade context, we will unravel the
trade regime. That was the concern. The response that I put in my letter,
which was also published by the Financial Times, was that, over the long
term, the sustainability of the trade regime or the environmental regime or
the human rights regime, depended upon their ability to integrate concerns.
None of the societal objectives have a particular primacy over another.
There was then a further letter in which I was accused of being anti-
economic growth, anti-development, anti-this, and anti-that. I received, a
number of letters from people who had read this exchange of
correspondence. Professor Cone suggested in our first conversation that
perhaps we could invite the various authors to talk about these issues at this
meeting, and I believe that was the genesis of this meeting. It's one of the
great things you learn is that if you take the time to write a letter to a
newspaper, you will get thirty or forty letters from all over the world, from
people unknown to you attacking you critically, inviting you to do this, that
* Philippe Sands is Reader in International Law at London University and Global
Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.
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and the other. It does in fact produce a response, so I want to thank you very
much to responding to that letter in a personal way and leading to this.
The simple point that I make by way of this introduction is that there is
a broader issue at stake here. We're not only concerned with trade and
environment, we are concerned with human rights and trade, human rights
and the environment, the law of the sea and trade, and the law of the sea and
the environment. The bigger issue is how do we, living in a single planet
divided among some 190 nations with about 20 major international legal
orders emerging sometimes in a reconciled way and sometimes in conflict,
meld the whole thing together in the absence of a central legislative or
judicial system. In a nutshell, that is the problem that we face. It is the
problem of globalization. It is in that context that the issues that were raised
by the United States' actions in, firstly, the tuna-dolphin case and, secondly,
the shrimp-turtle case, really need to be addressed. Do we believe in a
system which encourages unilateralism or do we want to move towards a
system which encourages multilateralism? Clearly, the two are not mutually
irreconcilable because those of us who look closely at the development in
international law, know that that tends to be a system going way back.
I looked with some of students in my course at NYU last week at an
1893 arbitration between the United Kingdom and the United States in which
the United States intervened beyond its territory to stop United Kingdom
registered fishing vessels from exploiting to extinction fur seals located in
the Bering Sea. It's a very wonderful arbitration. The award is about seven
pages and the pleadings are about 125 pages, but the pleadings are extremely
entertaining. In fact, the case is identical to the tuna-dolphin case a hundred
years later and the judgment was, in effect, the same. The tribunal said you
can't do that. It's extra territorial application of your laws. And according
to freedom of high sea. if the United Kingdom wmants in its wisdom to
exploit to extinction fur seals, there is no reason in law why it cannot do that.
However, since we have been encouraged to do so by the two states, we
hereby adopt regulation governing the taking of fur seals. Those regulations,
in fact, became among the earliest bilateral treaty-based regulations
governing the actions. You can fast forward and you'll find exactly the same
thing seventy years later in relation to efforts by Iceland during the
negotiation of the law of the sea convention to unilaterally extend its
exclusive fishery zone by fifty miles and exclude the United Kingdom from
fishing for cod in those waters and, lo and behold, what happens? Eight
years later, the United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea allowed
coastal states to extend to two hundred miles, their exclusive fishery zone.
So there is a link between unilateralism and multilateralism.
Even more recently in 1995, many of you will remember, Canada went
beyond its two hundred miles to stop a Spanish registered vessel from fishing
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for Greenland halibut, which is a species that migrates between the high seas
and Canada's exclusive economic zone. In part, the argument was that the
Spanish vessel was flouting Spain's quota under a relevant regional fisheries
agreement using nets which were illegal and so on and so forth. Lo and
behold, a few weeks later, the United Nations adopted an agreement, the
agreement on straddling stocks, which was a first for international law. The
agreement basically establishes the basis for stopping high seas freedom and
requiring states which wish to fish in areas regulated by regional agreement
to first become parties to those regional agreements. It's a unique agreement.
So, there is an inexorable link between unilateralism and subsequent
multilateral action. The difficulty moving on from those two contextual
elements is to deal with the situation that we face today in the trade and
environment context, and Steve has given an excellent exposition of a range
of cases that clearly have implications to the trade and environment nexus
and David has set some of the background in terms of the tuna and shrimp
cases.
I spend a lot of my time advising developing countries on issues so my
perspective would be slightly different. We've been presented today with a
rather compelling portrait of why the United States is or should be entitled
to take measures to control the activity of foreigners outside United States
territory in areas beyond anyone's national jurisdiction. I don't say for a
moment that I'm not in some way sympathetic to the desire, and I genuinely
believe, given the judicial and litigation histories in which those cases were
brought, that these were not cases in which the United States was seeking
competitive economic advantage. But the cases are problematic for another
reason, and the reason the tuna case is problematic - and it's a point that I
think that David didn't, I'm sure not intentionally, wish to address - is these
dolphins are not in any way endangered. What was really happening here,
was the United States was imposing upon third persons its own system of
values. For various reasons, American people have a high degree of empathy
to dolphins which even British people don't have. That requires and entitles
the United States to take measures and this was, from an international legal
perspective, fatal to the sympathies of a lot of people in relation to that case.
If the dolphin had been endangered, if there had been an international
agreement seeking to protect them from further endangerment, and if there
had been compelling evidence that the United States had in fact sought to
enter into an agreement with other states that might be affected then I think,
plausibly, the United States' actions were or might have been justifiable. I
think that people like me find themselves in the position with both the tuna-
dolphin panel decisions, of saying right result, wrong reasoning.
The reasoning is very problematic for a large number of reasons, and the
previous speakers have alluded to some of those reasons. I don't want to go
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into any great detail about what those reasons are, but the reasoning shuts the
door in a way that is perhaps more permanent and fixed than was necessary,
and the reasoning doesn't adopt an approach which I think would be from an
international legal perspective more plausible and more certain although it
alludes to the whole question of the desirability of one state applying its laws
extraterritorially. The second tuna panel decision in particular touches upon
that issue because among the three panelists was at least one international
lawyer who had a high degree of knowledge on environmental law.
One thing that is absolutely critical to understand, and I'm less critical
than Steve about the performance of the Appellate Body, is that the GATT
and WTO panels tend to be people who are trade diplomats. It's one hundred
percent understandable that their interest in life is maintaining the trade
regime. Why should they promote human rights or why should they promote
environment? They have been trade diplomats for years, and they have been
put there by their governments to protect that system. In the WTO Appellate
Body system we now have a number of individuals who come from a far
more general international background - for example, the formal Legal
Adviser to the European Commission, Claus Dieter Ehlerman and Philippine
Supreme Court Judge Florentino Feleciano. We begin now to see that the
excessive trade focus in the GATT is being replaced in the Appellate Body
context.
The shrimp-turtle case is perhaps not quite as problematic, but it
nevertheless is problematic. The turtles are listed on an endangered species
treaty. The problem with the treaty is that it doesn't regulate trade in shrimp.
It regulates trade in the turtles themselves which are listed on the convention.
The WTO panel did not accept the request of the United States to interpret
the Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species broadly. The
panel interpreted the Convention as regulating trade in turtles and did not
allow the United States to rely upon the provisions of that instrument to seek,
if you like, incidental protection through other trade measures. That problem
is compounded by the fact that the United States most regrettably is not a
party to other multilateral agreements which could conceivably be invoked
in support of its argument. Most specifically, the United States is not a party
to the Convention on Biological Diversity which contains a provision which
quite clearly could be construed to allow measures to be taken
extraterritorially where there is a serious threat to bio-diversity. So, one has
to look at the picture in a slightly broader context and imagine that there are
other ways of legally construing the situation. The United States will
probably also lose the shrimp-turtle case in large part because, whilst their
arguments are plausible in terms of the background of the rules of
international law which exist and upon which they can rely, they are not
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persuasive. I'll comment a little bit more about that in relation to the nature
of international environmental law and how one approaches it.
Now, that takes us to the key question. Clearly the WTO institutions
must be able to accommodate and integrate environmental standards, labor
standards, and human standards. Just today, we're reading about a new case
brought by - the debate that we're having now is not just about the
environment - the European Union and Japan against the United States
concerning the law in Massachusetts prohibiting the purchase by
Massachusetts authorities dealings with companies that engage in activities
in Burma on the grounds of Burma's atrocious human rights record and labor
standards. So, the same principles apply and what you ought to be hearing
me say is there is a need to accommodate these other standards. The GATT
system will not be able to sustain itself if it cannot do so. The question is
how do we do that? That's what I want to turn to very briefly. Well, there
are basically two ways of doing it. The first way of doing it is the legislative
route. Here, I'm focusing more on trade measures in relation to global
commons areas rather than trade measures relating to domestic activities and
focusing on the distinction which Steve drew between products on the one
hand and production processes and methods on the other hand. The
legislative way has been under way for about four years.
The WTO has established a committee on trade and environment to
examine all manner of issues including the relationship between the WTO
rules and the multilateral environmental agreement which now regulate a
whole range of issues. That committee has made absolutely no progress. It
might as well just be disbanded because it is a complete waste of time.
Views are utterly and totally polarized on it, and it's quite clear that states do
not have it in them to reach an agreement through the legislative process.
The only alternative that we have then is through some judicial initiative and
that places us now in the situation in which, unlike international law of
twenty years ago, we now have an international legal order in which there is
a range of judicial mechanisms available for states and other actors as a
result of these disputes. One of those is the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
My understanding is that in a couple of years, when the right case comes
along, and the right case I think has not yet come along, the Appellate Body
will have reached a sufficient degree of maturity and authority to be able to
indicate what the way forward is. Now, the Appellate Body is too young to
do that. The means exist in international law in order to do that and let me
explain a little more.
The process of treaty interpretation is governed by Articles XXXI and
XXXII of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. That provides for
the interpreter of the treaty to take into account a variety of sources in going
through the process of interpreting a treaty, and it is established in both the
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
GATT and WTO system that it is appropriate to take into account the Vienna
Convention rules in interpreting the treaty that is being applied and to go
through that process. The WTO Appellate Body has now said something that
was never said in any GATT panel previously, and that is that the rules of the
WTO have to be interpreted in a manner which is not in clinical isolation
from general public international law. That opens the door for the Appellate
Body, on the right case, to proceed by way of reference to Article XXXI,
paragraph iii, subparagraph C of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("XXXI.iii.C"). If you read the second Tuna panel case you will see
that they refer to the entirety of the text of Articles XXXI and XXXII except
XXXI.iii.C which is not mentioned. What does Article XXXI.iii.C say that
would indicate that it ought to be avoided? It says that in interpreting the text
of the treaty, it's appropriate to take into account other relevant rules of
international law. I'm told that in the second Tuna panel decision, one of the
panelists wanted to invoke Article XXXI.iii.C in order to reach a different
conclusion through a different form of reasoning. He was the sole
international lawyer on the panel. The two trade diplomats said absolutely
no way because that's going to open a Pandora's box and a can of worms,
and there is no way we are going down that route by taking into account
other rules of international law.
The GATT system will unravel, and that, in effect, is what the shrimp-
turtle panel said in relation to its approach to the interpretation of the
chapeau to Article XX. So, Article XXXI.iii.C amazingly has never been
referred to in a GATT panel decision or in a WTO panel decision or in the
Appellate Body decision. It's most interesting - and I don't know whether
the United States did it in its own submissions - that two of the amicus
briefs, which I understand from David were filed to the Appellate Body as
an attachment to the United States' submissions, made no reference to
whether they agreed with the contents specifically or to Article XXXI.iii.C
as a way forward. The difficulty on this case is whether or not one could
construe the endangerment of turtles in the convention on international trade
and species as reaching a customary international law status. In my view, the
better argument is, that it does and that if it wanted to, the Appellate Body
could go down that route, but the case did not sufficiently allow it to go
down that route.
In conclusion, the message I'm trying to say loud and clear is, firstly, we
need to think about these issues of trade and environment in their broader
context. Secondly, it is in the interest of thetrade system to accommodate
other societal interest if it is not to unravel at a later date. In the European
Union context, we have clear experience that interpreting the Treaty of
Rome, Articles XXX to XXXVI, by accommodating environmental
standards has not lead to an unraveling of the trade regime. Thirdly, we do
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not necessarily have to be unsupportive of unilateral measures if they are
subsequently followed by a multilateral approach which is I think what's
happened certainly in the tuna-dolphin cases. Fourthly and finally, we cannot
allow the international legal order to continue with these sort of self-
contained and self-referential regimes that do not reach out to meld a set of
broader societal interests which are not necessarily irreconcilable.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Thank you for that excellent exposition. The last
panelist, the cleanup hitter, Professor Srinivasan will now benefit us with his
remarks.
T.N. SRINIVASAN*: Thank you. I am in a bit of a handicap. I'm not a
lawyer. The previous three speakers are distinguished lawyers and they
made their excellent case from a legal perspective for what they were
arguing. I'm going to look at it primarily as an economist but before I do so,
I want to ask the following question following what Philippe said earlier.
Now, there is a trade law, there is a law of the sea, there is an intellectual
property law, there are other laws and the view seems to be that these are all
independent. They have their own existence and there is no connection
among them. Now, from my perspective, there is a trade institution, WTO,
there is an intellectual property institution, World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), there is an international labor organization which has
been concerned with labor and human rights. If one were interested in
human rights or in intellectual property matters, why not use these existing
organizations with their expertise, with their knowledge, and if their
enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough, why not negotiate, on how
these enforcement mechanisms of these organizations could be strengthened.
That is not the way the negotiations have gone. From the Uruguay round of
multilateral trade negotiations, matters which were not directly related to
trade were brought into the WTO framework. The reasons, as I see it, are
several. One reason is that trade policy instruments, trade sanctions, trade
embargoes, are seen as more effective instruments for enforcing something,
and so whether or not what you want to enforce is related to trade, why not
use the bludgeon of trade policy instrument to enforce it. That's one reason.
The other is, that if you look closely, either the tuna-dolphin case or the
shrimp-sea turtle case or the other similar cases to come, the developing
countries are involved on one side and the United States and the developed
countries are on the other side. Because of the success of GATT, and of its
* T.N. Srinivasan is the Samuel C. Park, Jr. Professor of Economics and Chairman of
the Department of Economics at Yale University.
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successor organization, WTO, world trade has been growing by leaps and
bounds. The developing countries which were previously not integrated into
the trading system, have become increasingly integrated and they are
competing effectively in the markets in the developed countries, and they see
the in markets are being threatened. One way of protecting their markets
would be to use old-fashioned protectionist instruments, tariffs, or non-tariff
barriers, but with the WTO and GATT being successful, those instruments
are not available. So, what is the best way, what is the alternative way of
attacking and addressing the competition from developing countries. There
are several ways you could do so. One way is to increase costs, either labor
costs by insisting that the developing countries, whether their labor market
conditions, or stage of development would allow or not, impose the labor
standards which they cannot afford or environmental standards which they
cannot afford. What would that mean? This would raise their costs and
reduce their ability to compete in the world market and that's one way you
could protect your markets. So from the developing country perspective, the
notion that there are the moral considerations involved in the human rights
issues, and there are global environmental considerations, all sound hollow.
Many developing countries see these as only camouflaging to the real end.
The real end is old-fashioned protectionism and that's how many developing
countries see it.
Now, let me take one example where there is universal agreement which
is also enshrined in GATT. This is about prohibition of trade in products
produced by prison labor. Okay. The GATT allows such prohibition. Now,
if we agree the universal moral norms are indeed the foundations of the case
against unfettered trade in product produced by prisoners, then what should
one make of the activities of UNICOR, a corporation wholly owned by the
government of the United States, run by the bureau of prisons in the United
States? It operates a hundred factories, sells over 150 products including
prescription glasses, safety eyeware, linens and so on and so forth. Its gross
sales in 1995 was around half a billion dollars of which wages paid to
prisoners was about only 35 million. According to the assistant director of
corporate management of UNICOR, prisoners, and I quote, "prisoners are not
covered by Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage laws, they don't get
retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, etc. They arejust workers
but they are not employees."
Besides publicly owned UNICOR, private industry has been attracted
and allowed to operate within prisons and, as the owner of one such private
company agreed, it was a fantastic deal all the way around. And he liked and
I quote, "the financial advantages of a prison business, namely getting to hire
the cream of the crop from a pool of cheap prison labor, not to mention the
use of brand new air-conditioned factory space rent free."
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The cost advantage of UNICOR and any private business operating with
prison labor should be obvious yet, as the narrator (this was in a 60 Minutes
program) of the story put it without realizing the absurdity of the economic
reasoning involved and I quote, "in 1934, when Congress created UNICOR,
it restricted its sales to one and only one customer, the federal government.
The reason was to prevent UNICOR's cheap prison labor from undercutting
private industry in the commercial market place, but Congress also armed
UNICOR with one big advantage - it gets first crack of the government's
business even at the expense of the private companies competing for the
same work."
Now, an economist or anyone with a little bit of economic reasoning
will tell you, any sale to government by UNICOR displaces what another
producer, domestic and foreign, would have made. It is irrelevant that
UNICOR is not allowed to export or sell to domestic private sector. Yet
those in the United States and the OECD who accuse less developed
countries of lower labor standards than their own as engaging in social
dumping, fail to see that the operation of UNICOR has the same effect. The
point I want to make is that there is no uniformity in the thinking about the
moral issues involved whether it is labor standards or environmental
standards.
Now, turning to environmental standards per se, one could distinguish
two separate categories: one is a purely a domestic environmental concern.
For example, if Indian producers or Indian activities pollute a lake within
India's borders, that's a purely domestic concern of India. Now, if India
pollutes the River Ganges which flows into Bangladesh, it's another matter.
It is a matter that is not purely Indian domestic concern. One would have
thought that on matters that are purely domestic, it should be no business of
any other country to say what standards that India or any other country
should have. But this is not what the environmentalists in the developed
countries argue. There are several reasons why they think that even purely
domestic environmental issues should be brought into the international
forum. One is the level playing field argument. If India has a lower labor
standard or a lower environmental standard, it gives "an unfair" competitive
advantage to India and so this ought to be countervailed through international
trade restrictions of some sort.
Now, if you think it through, for arguing such case whether the
competitive advantage arises, if it arises at all, from the lower environmental
standards or lower wages or whatever does not matter: Whatever competitive
advantage that a poor country has in competing in the developed country
markets, one way or the other, ought to be countervailed. If it can't be
countervailed through old-fashioned means, let's think of new means of
countervailing.
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Then there is the pollution haven seeking argument - that is, if India
or China or developing countries have lower environmental standards,
producers in the United States will shift their base of operation from the
United States to the countries which have lower environmental standards.
Now, on the face of it, it looks plausible. But if you analyze the available
empirical evidence, based on studies that the number of economists have
done, and examine what motivates multinational corporations to locate in
one country or the other, environmental laws come very at the very low end
of the ranking. They are more concerned about what the political risk in
investing in that country is going to be. What exchange the rate arrangement
in that country is going to be and so on. They are more concerned about
other risks of doing business than the possible advantage of moving into a
country with lower environmental standards. And so the pollution-haven
argument doesn't apply as well.
Now, if you recognize that countries of the world are at different stages
of development, different levels of income and different valuation of the
costs and benefits of putting in an environmental protection measure, then
you would recognize that diversity in labor standards, and diversity in
environmental standards, would be the norm rather than an exception. And
so, if there is diversity, and if that diversity is legitimate, there is no
particular reason to think in terms of harmonizing the standards regardless
of the stages of development the different countries might be in. And this
particular consideration is very salient when it comes to labor standards and
it is not that much different in the case of environmental standards. Let me
turn to the issue of unilateralism versus multilateralism. The previous
speakers provided evidence from the recent cases that unilateralism by the
United States ended up eventually in a multilateral outcome that perhaps is
desirable.
Now, I have difficulty with this argument on two grounds. One is this
is, as a general principle, not evident to me that every exercise of aggressive
unilateralism will necessarily result in a benign multilateralism at the end.
So, the outcome is not certain. Now, it's not also obvious to me why one
couldn't start the other way. Take the tuna-dolphin case, for example. There
was no attempt, as far as I know, of trying to persuade the Mexicans and the
rest of the world before the import ban was instituted, to persuade them from
why the dolphins are so important, why they should value the dolphins the
same way the United States was valuing them, and why, in their own
interests, the Mexicans should do what the US wanted to do. This wasn't
done. Now, you started with this trade embargo and then proceeded to move
from there on after the GATT panel ruling. Why not, if indeed, the
multilateral option is available, why not try the multilateral option first and,
if it fails, then the unilateral option is always available. It is not ruled out.
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And so, I'm not persuaded by the case, by the argument that unilateralism,
and particularly of the type that the US has pursued, namely the aggressive
unilateralism, is going to necessarily result in benign multilateralism.
I will conclude with the plea that we utilize all the institutions that are
available to achieve desirable goals in the area of environment, in the area
of labor standards, in the area of intellectual property and what have you.
Let us strengthen the specialized institutions, and if there is a conflict or if
there is a problem of the jurisdictions of two or more institutions not
overlapping and their principles are not consistent, there are ways of
coordination and consultation among institutions to resolve them. If we load
on the WTO, which has a very well-defined trade mandate, and which had
a successful history of promoting world trade over the five decades and
divert it into areas which are not really trade related, this is going to unravel
WTO. In the end, we will neither have better environment nor better human
rights, but only have poor trade and poor economic growth. Thank you.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: I want to thank the four speakers and with their
approval, we'll proceed to request questions from the floor.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have two questions. Since I'm probably not
going to get another shot at this microphone, I thought I'd ask both while I'm
up here. One is for Philippe Sands. You have indicated that you thought
there were two ways of getting to the goal line of having an international
organization that could uphold and enforce environmental standards. One
was essentially legislative and one was judicial. I was wondering if you
thought there was any merit to the notion that perhaps we have a sufficient
amount of legislative authority out there and that perhaps there is an
executive function or executive branch that could have some effective role
to play in this context. Do you think perhaps the UN or some other
organization might use the existing legislative framework to take executive
action that would be effective? And for Professor Srinivasan - I thought
your defense of free trade and your comments about why a level playing field
is not necessary to be somewhat persuasive with respect to purely domestic
issues, but I noticed that when you moved into the international arena, you
really didn't address the question of what happens when you're dealing with
the global resource or global issue and how do we establish a system or how
do we defend or what are the arguments against having some sort of
universal standard in that context?
PHILIPPE SANDS: Outside of the European Union context, there isn't
really in the international legal order, the type of executive authority that I
think you're referring to. We are essentially living in a world of
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desegregated international institutions which are nothing more than the sum
of their parts, namely, their membership. Members have been unwilling
outside of the European Union context to hand over to institutions this type
of executive function. For example, there is no possibility of the United
Nations bringing proceedings on behalf of the turtle, of Southeast Asia. We
just don't have that institutional structure outside of the European Union.
Personally, I'm persuaded that it is inevitable as the international legal order
matures, and it is somewhere in the medieval era at this point, that that will
come. But I think it's unlikely in the very short term, either in the trade or
in the environment. We've seen in the human rights context efforts to
empower Mary Robinson in relation to the promotion of human rights
internationally are really falling very short of what a lot of the human rights
activists and some states want to do. So, I think that's some way off and into
the vacuum, and we're in a legislative logjam equally internationally. My
instinct is that that is the place where the changes, if they are to occur, will
occur.
T.N. SRINIVASAN: You're right, I didn't address the question of the
international rather than domestic environmental issue. Now let me take the
example of global warming and emission of greenhouse gases as an example
of the global pollution issue. Now, here I would argue there is an equity
issue and there is an efficiency issue. The efficiency issue is that suppose
internationally or multilaterally, it is agreed that the emissions have to be
reduced to a certain level. Now, what is the least costly way of achieving
that reduction? Now that might involve much of the reduction taking place
in let's say certain countries, Okay? Now, the equity part of it is that the cost
of achieving that reduction in that country should not be borne only by that
country hecam-ze it ik n global. So what is the solution? If first we agree
multilaterally, for global welfare reasons, how much reduction should take
place, you decide what is the least costly way of doing it. Perhaps
compensation through income transfer or technology transfer or whatever the
countries which have to bear most of the reduction requirement. So if you
had that arrangement by which the goals are multilaterally set, and their
efficiently implemented and equitably shared, that would be the route I
would go rather than say - look, if you don't reduce your CO 2 emissions or
SO 2 emissions by such and such, your market access to the United States is
going to be denied through linking the environment with the trade policies.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just briefly that, sure, while theoretically one could
imagine some sort of compensation mechanism, I mean the United States has
a hard time just paying our UN dues, so for us to imagine us appropriating
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money or something to compensate for the other countries, I think that would
be pretty hard.
T.N. SRINIVASAN: Then you shouldn't talk about environmental goals.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We're derelict these days in paying our dues to a
number of, not only to the WTO and I think UNEP and the UN generally.
Absolutely, it's a problem.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Well, I'm not sure you're not engaging yourself
in this sort of linkage of money with ideas. Let's move on.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When this issue came out, I guess in the press,
regarding the sea turtle business conflict, I think that many people within the
international trade community who are not openly environmentalist
definitely expressed their outrage and disappointment with the different
trading partners. What I'd like some of the panel members at least to touch
upon is that I read in the New York Times that the United States did offer
foreign assistance to pay for turtle excluders. I guess as a business person,
one sits back and wonders, that you're being offered money to offset some
of these costs and, really, what their rationale was? I believe there were three
different countries, and supposedly they just cited their principles but I want
to know if you knew more about this.
DAVID BALTON: I might be able to address that. In fact, for about ten
years, the United States government has been engaging in a thorough
aggressive campaign to transfer the technology to protect sea turtles in the
course of shrimp-trawl fishing. With our friends the National Marine
Fisheries Service, the Department of State has conducted up to fifty
seminars and training exercises in foreign countries to show people how to
make TEDs, how to install them, and how to use them. It's not rocket
science, but it is a little tricky and it does require some training and practice.
Also, we have invited scores of foreign officials to the United States for
similar training in a laboratory in Pascagoula, Mississippi. The TEDs
themselves are very cheap. In India, for example, they can be manufactured
from local materials for about eight to twelve dollars. So, actually, providing
the TEDs themselves is not nearly such a valuable thing to do as to provide
training in how to use them and how to install them. That's what we have
been doing, rather successfully. It has led to the adoption of programs
requiring their use in many countries. Thank you.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Next. Yes?
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question is directed to Philippe Sands. I think
your point about the need for coordination between our international legal
regimes is well taken. I wonder if there was a consensus that the WTO
agreements should be interpreted in light of the existing international
obligations of the members - whether the Appellate Body would be the
appropriate forum for addressing those issues?.
PHILIPPE SANDS: I'm pretty optimistic about the Appellate Body. I mean
I think that there are a number of extremely able individuals on the Appellate
Body. I think it's very difficult for them in their early days to exercise the
type of decisive decision-making in the direction that you have indicated
because institutions take time to get up and running. But they have taken a
number of very dramatic steps. As lawyers, we know that he or she who
controls the drafting has a decisive input on the final outcome. One of the
rules that has always applied in the GATT was that panel decisions would be
drafted by the Secretariat of the GATT not by the panel members
themselves. That has continued to prevail for the most part in the WTO
context. At its very first meeting, when the WTO Secretariat turned up to
assist the Appellate Body in the drafting of its first report, they were
excluded from the room. They were told that they were not needed. I
suspect that we will begin to see the Appellate Body.exercising the type of
judicial independence that was never shown in other bodies. So, I remain
pretty optimistic at this point. Nothing I've seen yet - and I know that for
some diehard GATT persons - I happen to be with the former legal advisor
to the GATT the day the Appellate Body handed down its first decision in
the Gasoline case, and he literally, no kidding, almost started crying when he
saw the approach to analysis that the Appellate Body was taking. When he
saw the words WTO System is not to be interpreted in clinical isolation from
public international law. Those few words have dramatic consequences. So,
I think they are preparing themselves to gear up to some rather decisive
action although, as I indicated, this isn't quite the right case.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: But before we go to the previous question, was
your question, Ma'am, addressed to the competence of the individuals who
at the moment happen to compose the Appellate Body, or was your question
more of an institutional one?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think it's both really.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Would you care to comment on the institutional
aspect of the Appellate Body which is a WTO Appellate Body and it isn't
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even the supreme WTO body for disputes only, institutionally, the proper
place to fuse diverse international agreements?
PHILIPPE SANDS: Well, I think the sad truth is that there isn't anywhere
else. The International Court of Justice isn't going to do it because it tends
to shy away from the hard technical type of issues. And it might give some
general dicta on methods of interpretation, and so on and so forth. The Law
of the Sea Convention has an express provision which makes it clear that if
a trade issue arises, it is to be addressed not in context of the law of the sea,
but in the context of GATT is what is what they've got in the text. One can
image human rights instruments dealing within some corners but they don't
yet have those bodies, the type of decisive authority that the Appellate Body
has, so I suspect that, for better or worse, it is likely to developed by the
Appellate Body. I apologize. I didn't understand that side of the question.
But it's a very valid part of the question. Thank you very much for raising
that.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: You were going to revert to the earlier question.
PHILIPPE SANDS: I wasjust going to say that in terms of David's answer,
I didn't hear whether you confirmed the United States had actually offered
to pay for any of these turtle excluder devices. You indicated that there were
seminars and teachings. But I didn't know whether there were any transfers
financially available. But I would just throw out the question, - let's
imagine a group of Chinese town planners coming to the United States and
offering to give seminars on town planning and how you build towns which
are not spread over 1,400 square miles, but rather are spread over 50 square
miles so that people don't need to use their cars, so that people don't need to
drive as much. I mean, it would have exactly the same reaction. It would be
rejected as a totally unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of the
state, and outrage would be expressed. It's about how you do these things.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Are you speaking of this country or of your own?
PHILIPPE SANDS: I am speaking in particular of this country, Sydney. But
I can tell you it would have the same reaction in the UK.
DAVID BALTON: I would have to comment that in the case of the training
exercises we have run, they have met with very positive reactions on the part
of the recipients. We have done so many of them because they've been
requested of us. Let me also add that the turtle excluder device is not a piece
of United States technology. Indonesia was using TEDs long before we
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were. While there are problems of communication, cultural differences, and
certainly disparities of economic development, in fact shrimp trawling is
more or less the same exercise no matter where it takes place in the world.
Very much the same gear is used, and the institution of this particular piece
of technology is something that can be learned by people in different
languages and at different stages of economic development, quite
successfully. It's not like Chinese town planners coming to the United
States. Thank you.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Next question. Somebody else over here. Yes,
Ma'am?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I want to just read this to you. The devices -the
turtle excluder devices could save ninety-seven percent of the 150, 000 sea
turtles that die in nets every year by losing up to three percent maximum of
the shrimp. If we were to go towards green accounting, we could, for
example, give to everybody who uses the excluder devices subsidies and
monies for what the saving of the turtles that they accomplish. And this way,
I think, you could get a push towards everybody being interested in using
them. That's maybe the other way to approach this issue.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Thank you. Does anyone want to comment on that
comment?
DAVID BALTON: I would say I agree with that.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: You've managed to evoke agreement among the
panelists. My congratulations.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This really is a question for Mr. Charnovitz. I
detected some note of pessimism about the lack of consensus or ability of
both sides of this equation to persuade each other on how best to
accommodate some of the mutual goals. I note that at the end you said that
the challenge is really to find some way to get people to meet in the middle.
I think my question really is, what kinds of activities do you see that can best
promote that? As a practicing member of the Bar and Chairman of one of
the Association's committees, my ideas for the fostering of public dialogue
through evenings like this. But, I'm curious to hear what else, in your mind,
is the best way to move toward that goal, I think it's a very laudable one.
STEVE CHARNOVITZ: Yes, that's a good question. I guess I am kind of
pessimistic about this. I see in the - as Philippe said - in the World Trade
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Organization, the Committee on Trade and Environment, and its two
predecessors, made virtually no progress on this issue. We have in the
United States over the last four years or so a debate about extending fast
track authority to the President to negotiate new trade agreements and we've
made really no progress over that. One of the key issues there is how you
deal with environmental concerns. We have in the free trade area of the
Americas those negotiations going on. There was an important meeting this
week on that to get those trade negotiations moving. Yet, there's been very
little progress among the countries in thinking about what are the
environmental dimensions of that regional economic integration. So, I guess,
I am a little pessimistic. But I think events like this are the right approach.
We've got to get people from the different perspectives together in a
dialogue to talk about these issues and go beyond the polarization and
looking at some of the false issues, but rather look at the issues where there
ought to be some common ground. I mean we ought to have common
ground on a global environmental issue like endangered sea turtle. That's
really the core issue here, not telling a country what to do about its own
domestic environmental policy. I think we've got to get people from the
business community, and the environmental community, and consumer
groups and other stake-holders in the debate along with people from the
government and try to talk through these issues and make progress both
nationally in our own system where our trade policy has been on hold for
four years, and internationally to get a new WTO millennium trade round
started, and to make progress in regional agreements to the extent we're
going to move on regionally on these kinds of issues. So I think that this sort
of setting is a good one, and we just need more things like this.
T.N. SRINIVASAN: May I add a word?
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Please.
T.N. SRINIVASAN: I'm not persuaded that the fact that the trade and
environment committee in the WTO hasn't progressed very far, there is that
thing in and of itself. The reason it hasn't gone very far is that, unlike in
trade matters, the agreement on environmental matters, universal agreement
on environmental matters, isn't there, and when there is no agreement, trying
to push what might be special interest relating to environment through an
organization on which there is universal agreement about trade matters, this
will not go anywhere until there is much better consensus on what one wants
to do in the environmental direction. So, in that sense I view this as a
positive outcome rather than a negative outcome, that the trade and
environment committee hasn't gone anywhere in WTO.
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PANELIST: I guess I'm not sure I would view the WTO or the GATT as an
institution on which there was universal agreement on trade matters. When
I'm thinking about the trade environment debate, I'm thinking about the need
to make progress toward free trade as a goal, and also to make progress
toward better environmental protection. I think both concerns are equally
important and I'd like to see the WTO do a lot more to move toward free
trade. I don't see any consensus there at all. The committee on trade and
environment could be doing that, too. It could be pointing out the
environmental gains that could be gotten from less protectionism and more
trade. So, it's not just an environmental agenda. It's not a question of, as
you said before, overloading the system. The system in the WTO is
supposed to be aimed at emancipating trade and liberalizing trade. It's not
doing that too well either. So, I think environmentalists need to be pushing
not just to safeguard sea turtles, but they ought to be pushing to liberalize
trade.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: I might say that the fact that the committee on
trade and the environment has thus far not made significant progress is not
surprising. It took seven years to conclude the Uruguay round. These
matters take time. There is an unbelievable large number of interests that
have to be accommodated and dealt with. If one is not endowed with
considerable patience in this area, one should pick another area of
intellectual interest. Sir?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Chair of the International Trade Committee
here at the Association of the Bar. If you assume that countries enter into
multilateral treaties, let's say in the environmental field or in the labor field
- take your pick - and then they don't live up to those commitments that
they've made in those treaties. If you don't use trade measures, how do you
enforce those treaties? How do you bring a recalcitrant signatory to a treaty
back in to live up to its commitments? For Professor Srinivasan or any of the
other panelists.
T.N. SRINIVASAN: Let me take a crack at it. First of all, the notion that
trade instruments are always effective in enforcing, I think this is wrong for
several reasons. The one country on which this trade measure is applied has
always got the option to forego the gains from trade, and not do anything.
You can have a trade embargo, but no effect on the environment that you
want to achieve through trade embargo. So the effectiveness of trade
instrument is exaggerated. So I question your premise that trade instrument
is effective, and that is the only instrument that is available to force countries
to conform to agreement that they have signed on. The other argument is
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that if you are designing an agreement, it has to be a self-enforcing
agreement. It has to have, in and of itself, within the agreement or within the
institution measures that ensure that there is compliance. Simply having an
agreement when you know you have an issue that the incentives for
complying with that agreement are not uniform across the signatories, that
is a prescription for the treaty not being effective. And so, again, it seems to
me that both that the panel negotiating the kind of agreement, you have to
pay attention to whether the agreement is in the interest of parties who are
signing, to enforce.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Philippe.
PHILIPPE SANDS: You've raised an interesting perspective that we haven't
touched on and that's the use of trade measures, if you like, as a carrot rather
than as a stick in international agreements. There are now a number of
international agreements, environmental and other, which contain provisions
that effectively provide that the states which are not parties to the agreement
- they will suffer trade restrictions. I'm thinking of the Montreal Protocol
on Ozone Depleting Substances and Richard Stewart and I at NYU served
four years as legal advisors to the Environmental Protection Committee of
the National People's Congress of China. It was made abundantly clear to
us that if there had not been that provision in the text, China would not have
become a party to the Montreal Protocol. I suspect, the same is with India,
coupled with some financial incentives that are of a rather minimal character.
The Basle Convention on Trans-Boundary Movement in Hazardous Waste
has the same provision and that since the United States is not a party, now
has the effect and principle of excluding the United States from trading
internationally with the developing world in hazardous waste. United States
industry, I understand, is champing at the bit to get the Senate to ratify that
particular instrument. Finally, and one which is an interesting one, the
chemical weapons convention has a remarkable provision in it which
basically says you can't trade in chemicals - a whole list of chemicals -
which could be used to make chemical weapons if you are not a part of the
chemical weapons convention. It was only on the basis of that provision that
the United States became a party to that convention. I remember the
tremendous debate there was in Congress. Ultimately it was industry that
insisted. There, I think, are three examples of trade restrictions being used
as carrots rather than as sticks but have been very effective in bringing
participants into a regime, and in that sense strengthening the regime.
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T.N. SRINIVASAN: Within each of those examples within those regimes,
WTO was not brought in at all. The trade sanctions through WTO were not
brought in.
PANELIST: If you look at the history of international environmental
treaties, you'd see from the very first environmental treaty in 1900 and the
second one, that the use of trade measures to make the treaties work.
Certainly not all environmental treaties these days have trade measures.
Very few of them do. But there has been a long time recognition that trade
measures could be useful in an environmental treaty.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: It's nine o'clock. We'll take one more question
from this gentleman here.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a principal at Golden Associates, a customs
and international trade firm here in New York, and a former member of the
Committee on International Trade here. A lot of the discussion has focused
on broadening the GATT to deal more with environmental issues or keeping
its focus narrow. I think there's an important distinction that's been blurred
between the sea turtle type issue and the more classic trade/environmental
issue.
The sea turtle issue is an international issue because it involves
harvesting of a natural resource in international waters. It's not necessarily
a GATT or a trade issue. There are other treaties that cover it and there can
be other treaties that deal with it. Really, GATT is convenient because
GATT has an enforcement mechanism which other treaties don't have. But
there's a classic trade environmental issue in which the liberalization of trade
is literally creating the environmental problem. To me, that's the issue where.
the GATT must address the environmental issue. And it's a classic dilemma.
As you lower trade barriers, you enable manufacturers to move to really
sharp jurisdictions for production. Classically, manufacturers look for cheap
labor production location. But, that's only really very labor-intensive
industries-when they look for jurisdictions where labor is cheap and labor
regulation is loose either in enforcement or in drafting. In certain industries
where environmental costs are a major concern, manufacturers can look for
jurisdictions where environmental regulation is loose, either in enforcement
or in drafting, they can move to those jurisdictions and, because of the
lowering of trade barriers, they can move their product produced in those
jurisdictions, to any market in the world. And you end up having a race to
the bottom in the sense thatjurisdictions then have to, in order to compete for
the manufactures lower their trade regulations and enforcement to compete
to bring manufacturers back. And the classic dilemma that occurs when you
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are liberalizing trade barriers, is that you really need to have some kind of
minimal standard for regulation and enforcement of regulation to prevent the
race to the bottom. That occurs in all areas actually of commercial
regulations, not just environmental regulation.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: The race to the bottom, or as Professor Srinivasan
has written, I believe it was Professor Srinivasan, more accurately might be
called the race toward the bottom is a dilemma that I think the panel is
familiar with. So if you will permit me, I will now take that concept which
the T.N. did talk about and did say was more of an illusion in his view than
a problem and so I will abridge your question, sir, and ask the panelists to
deal with it. Sir?
DAVID BALTON: I would start by observing that the sea turtle case is the
classic case. Shrimp are not harvested in international waters. They are
harvested in waters under national jurisdiction. Because United States trade
barriers or tariffs on shrimp are so low, eighty percent of the shrimp
consumed in this country is imported. There is a lot of production of shrimp
in other countries to satisfy the United States market and, because of that,
environmental harm is if not created at least exacerbated, namely, the killing
of sea turtles. And, while I have the floor, I wanted to take on at least call
into question a comment by Philippe Sands earlier...
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Before we call Philippe to task. Well, we will get
to that. Any other comments on the race to or toward the bottom? You
really dealt with it. Yes, it was dealt with by you earlier. Right. Okay. Why
don't we now go on.
DAVID BALTON: The race to the bottom problem or toward the bottom
problem is, in my view, a real one in this case. We did try to present that to
the WTO panel and to the Appellate Body. Interestingly though, we did not
ask either the WTO panel or the Appellate Body to look beyond the four
squares of the WTO Agreement in the way that Philippe Sands suggested
might be appropriate. We did refer to the Law of the Sea Convention, and
the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, but only to support tangential
propositions, namely, that sea turtles are recognized to be endangered, that
there is a general commitment to conserve living marine resources and to
minimize what we call by catch, particularly endangered species. But we
felt, and still feel, that, this particular United States trade measure isjustified
under the actual terms of Article XX of the WTO Agreement sitting by itself.
For those of you familiar with it, under Article XX(g), we feel that this is a
measure that relates to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource,
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the sea turtle. We do make it effective, we think, in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production. United States shrimpers have to observe
the very same rules that we require of imported shrimp. And we do think we
satisfy the terms of the Chapeau to Article XX that this is neither an arbitrary
nor unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail. In fact, we think we treat like countries alike, and different countries
differently. And, finally, it's not a disguised restriction on international
trade. If it were disguised, why would we have undertaken the effort we
have to promote the use of turtle excluder devices, and to encourage
countries to protect sea turtles? Anyway, I just thought I'd offer that up as
a final thought of mine. Thanks.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: Shall we let the Department of State have the final
word or do you want to respond to that?
PHILIPPE SANDS: Very brief. Just the analysis, David, would apply
equally to Dolphins so you draw no distinction between the two cases. I
think the central ...
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: The dolphins are underrepresented on this panel.
PHILIPPE SANDS: I think the critical issue is, the word is coercion, to what
extent is the United States coercing other states to adopt a certain form of
behavior. I think the way out for the Appellate Body is to find a way of
satisfying itself that coercion is not occurring. The only way it can do that
is by reference to some other instrument. It might or might not indicate that
these countries have voluntarily accepted limits on their freedom in relation
to harvesting of certain species. I think if the Appellate Body can ntikfv
itself that there isn't in the sense that the 1994 tuna-dolphin panel found
coercion, then, I think, your test is satisfied. But in this case it is not clear
whether there was coercion.
DAVID BALTON: My only problem with that analysis is that I don't see
the word coercion in Article XX. I think, and this maybe a radical thought,
that Article XX ought to be applied as written, and maybe it really does mean
that countries did not agree to limit their right to restrict imports, or exports
I might add, for the sorts of reasons listed in Article XX, whatever the
consequences. Thank you.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III: I want to thank everyone - the panelists and the
participants. I think this has been a very successful symposium, and I now
declare it - with thanks - adjourned.
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